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Abstract
The SSNIP test for market definition requires information about de-
mand substitution and profitability. If detailed information about demand
is not available, observed effects of a shock in the industry may be an al-
ternative source of evidence. In the existing literature, shock analysis has
unfortunately not been clearly linked to the SSNIP test. The lack of a
rigorous framework may confuse the interpretation of the effects of shocks.
We illustrate how a shock can be evaluated within the SSNIP framework
with a minimum of data. We apply our criterion to a capacity expansion
in the ferry market in the North Sea.
1 Introduction
Market definition is an important part of almost all competition cases as it iden-
tifies the competitive constraints facing the product of interest. Most competi-
tion authorities delineate markets using the SSNIP test1: The relevant market is
the smallest group of products where a hypothetical monopolist can profitably
raise price(s) by 5-10% above the competitive level.2 The SSNIP test provides
well-defined principles that guide the delineating process. Harris and Simons
[1989] reformulated the SSNIP test in terms of the critical loss - i.e. the loss in
own demand after the price change which would leave the joint profits of the
included products unchanged. To perform the SSNIP test the critical loss is
compared to an estimate of the actual loss following the price increase. While
a product’s price-cost margin determines the critical loss, an assessment of the
actual loss typically requires estimating a demand system. Estimates of demand
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tions: Norwegian Competition Authority, Norwegian Competition Authority and Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration, and Norwegian Competition Authority and
University of Oxford, respectively. This paper represents our personal views, not necessarily
shared by the Norwegian Competition Authority. Thanks to Arild Aakvik, Gregory Werden
and Frode Steen for comments on previous drafts.
1Small but Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in Price.
2There is a subtle difference between the SSNIP test of the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines
and the EU Notice on market delineation. The European guidelines asks if a hypothetical
monopolist could profitably increase prices by above some given level, whereas the US version,
arguably, asks whether a profit-maximizing hypothetical monopolist would increase prices by
above some threshold level, see Werden [2002] for a discussion of the tests. The profitability
test nevertheless seems to be the most pervasive test applied both in the literature and in
US case law. We follow the convention of the simple profitability test rather than the profit
maximization test.
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systems are unfortunately seldom available in competition cases, often due to
lack of relevant data andor time constraints.
If there is a lack of detailed data on demand, one alternative strategy is to
investigate the effects of some unexpected event, a shock, in the industry in the
past. A relevant shock can be the introduction of a new product, cost shocks,
technological change or a change in relative prices. There is, however, an ap-
parent lack of well-defined principles on how to evaluate the effects of a shock.
For instance, the Commission notice on the definition of the relevant market
explicitly endorses shock analysis:3
“In certain cases, it is possible to analyse evidence relating to re-
cent past events or shocks in the market that offer actual examples
of substitution between two products. When available, this sort of
information will normally be fundamental for market definition. [...]
Launches of new products in the past can also offer useful infor-
mation, when it is possible to precisely analyse which products lost
sales to the new products.”
In the same spirit, Bishop and Walker [2002], p. 323, state:
“Shock analysis is a way of thinking about what past events in an
industry tell us about the form of competition in that industry”.
Neither the Commission notice nor Bishop and Walker provide any standards by
which the magnitudes of reactions to the shock should be evaluated. Without
a proper framework, there is a risk that measured effects are evaluated against
any number of arbitrary standards. Since market delineation is defined by the
SSNIP-test, shock analysis is useful for market delineation to the extent it in-
forms on the profitability of a price increase for the hypothetical monopolist.4
It might be necessary to interpret the effects of the shock within a structural
model to properly address the profitability question. This paper suggests a way
of doing that. We derive a threshold level of substitution for when two products
belong to the same market from the principles of the SSNIP test. We then eval-
uate the observed effects of the shock to the criterion and delineate the market
accordingly.
In contrast to the critical loss test of Harris and Simons [1989], we don’t impose
a proportionate price increase on all the products in the candidate market, but
follow Katz and Shapiro [2003] in imposing an asymmetric price increase. As
the purpose of market delineation is to identify competitive constraints, there
may be good reasons to prefer an asymmetric price increase in cases where there
are important asymmetries between products.5
By imposing a standard pricing rule we simplify the delineating criterion and
focus on the diversion ratio, the share of the decrease of sales for product 1 that
3See Commission notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of com-
munity competition law (OJ 372, 9/12/1997), paragraph 38.
4Note that market delineation and competitive effects analysis are not the same thing.
Evidence quite useless for market delineation may be highly useful for competitive effects
analysis, and vice versa.
5See Daljord, Sørgard and Thomassen [2007] for a discussion.
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is diverted to product 2 following a price increase on product 1.6 We show that
the only information we then need in addition to the diversion ratio, is the mar-
gin of the product in question and the relative mark-ups of the two products.
Though the margins can be hard to estimate, we show how it might be possible
to establish useful bounds to their relative sizes. Given a margin on product
1, we then have a criterion for the critical diversion ratio.7 To check whether
the two products belong to the same market, we compare the critical diversion
ratio with the actual diversion ratio.
We illustrate how to estimate a diversion ratio from a shock in the ferry in-
dustry in the North Sea without estimating a full demand system. The shock
we exploit is an expansion of the capacity of one of two ferries in a candidate
market and we only have a time-series of passenger data. Theoretical consider-
ations and observed passenger numbers indicate that a change in relative prices
has taken place, but prices are unobserved. We estimate a diversion ratio from
the observed passenger substitution following the shock. We then compare the
actual diversion ratio with the critical diversion ratio, where the latter is given
for different combinations of price-cost margins. The application shows that it is
possible to properly perform the SSNIP test with only a limited amount of data.
The next section establishes the criterion in terms of a critical diversion ra-
tio which is the link between the shock analysis and the SSNIP criterion. The
third section explains how the shock analysis was performed on the ferry mar-
ket, using the test from section 2. The last section concludes. Full estimation
results are in the appendix.
2 The theoretical framework
The market delineating procedure is defined by the 1992 US Horizontal Merger
Guidelines on page 6 as
“[...][B]egin with each product (narrowly defined) produced or sold
by each merging firm and ask what would happen if a hypothetical
monopolist of that product imposed at least a “small but significant
and nontransitory increase in price, but the terms of sale of all other
products remained constant”
Note that the Guidelines are not explicit about whether the test requires an in-
crease in one, some or all of the prices of the products in the candidate market.
As noted by Whinston [2007], the choice between the one-price and the multi-
price criterion cannot be deduced from neither theory alone, nor the Guidelines,
and is apparently left open to the analyst.
We argue that the ambiguity with respect to prices provides valuable scope
for the analyst to adopt the profitability criterion that makes most economic
6The argument is easily extended to the general case of J products in the candidate market.
7Our critical diversion ratio is related to the critical diversion ratios in O’Brien and Wick-
elgren [2003], but their thresholds are based on increasing all prices in the candidate market.
We increase only one price.
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sense in light of the purpose of market definition. Consider for instance a candi-
date market with one product with small sales, low margins and a high degree
of price sensitivity that competes with a product with large sales, high margins
and low price sensitivity. Then the hypothetical monopolist would prefer to
increase the price of the small product more than the price of the large product.
If so, the constraints may be more effectively identified by increasing only the
price of the small product. Like Katz and Shapiro [2003], we derive a one-price
criterion.8 As we show in the next section, the industry we analyze displays
important asymmetries between firms. We opt for increasing the price of only
one product as it likely more effectively identifies the competitive constraints
compared to increasing the price of all products proportionately.
The criterion of the Harris and Simons critical loss test (i.e. that a propor-
tionate price increase for all the products increases joint profits) is expressed
in terms of prices, costs and features of the demand curve. Katz and Shapiro
[2003] further develops the critical loss concept by formulating the criterion in
terms of the diversion ratio, relative profitability and the margin on the price-
increasing product. We apply the Katz and Shapiro concept to shock analysis,
and thereby introduce a direct link between the SSNIP test and shock analysis.
The setting is an industry with differentiated products. We analyse the ef-
fects on two products, though we allow for competition from other products.
We assume that marginal cost is constant for both firms and that the price of
firm 1 has been set to maximize profits given the price of the other firm.9
In our practical application the aim is to determine whether product 1 is a
market of its own, or whether it is in a market with product 2 (and possibly
other products). It is assumed that inspection of the market has revealed that
no product can conceivably be a closer substitute to product 1 than product 2
is.10 The SSNIP test starts by asking whether an increase in the price of prod-
uct 1 would be profitable for a hypothetical monopolist owning products 1 and 2.
If the increase is profitable, we can draw the conclusion that there is indeed
significant substitution from 1 to 2. Product 2 is therefore a competitive con-
straint on product 1 and the two must be in the same market. If, on the other
hand, the price increase is not profitable another step is needed before the test
procedure can reach a conclusion. The reason is that there are two possible
scenarios which could explain why the SSNIP is not profitable: (a) substitution
from product 1 to product 2 is insignificant, so owning both products does not
make it profitable to increase the first price; or (b) there is significant substi-
tution from product 1 to product 2, but there is also sufficient substitution to
at least one third product to make the price increase unprofitable. In the first
case product 1 is in a market of its own, while in the second case the market
includes other products in addition to 1 and 2.
8But for different reasons. Katz and Shapiro derive a one-price criterion arguing that it is
the proper interpretation of the Guidelines.
9The optimal pricing assumption is necessary to show that the own-price elasticity of
demand ηjj =
pj
qj
∂qj
∂pj
, is equal to minus the inverse of the margin, − 1
Lj
.
10In the application in section 3, this assumption is based on obvious geographical features
of the market.
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To distinguish between (a) and (b) it is necessary to look at whether the SSNIP
would be profitable if the hypothetical monopolist owned both products 1 and
2 and the second-best substitute to product 1, i.e. product 3. The criterion
for the strength of substitution which we develop in this paper can be extended
to this multi-product case in a straightforward way. Here we limit ourselves
to develop the theory for the two-product case. As discussed in the previous
paragraph, if the conclusion of the two-product SSNIP test is that product 2
is indeed a competitive constraint on product 1, there is no need to proceed to
a multi-product test: it is then clear that product 1 is in the same market as
product 2. We now go on to derive the criterion which will be used to perform
the test.
Let α be the percentage increase in the price of product 1 (normally this is
0.05 or 5%). We assume that the price of product 2 is held constant when the
price of product 1 increases. We analyse this experiment under the assumption
of linear demand.11 In section 3.5, we relax this assumption.
When p1 increases to p1(1 + α), the demand for product 2 increases by a per-
centage αη21, where ηij is the cross elasticity of demand for product 2 wrt. the
price of product 1. Let CL denote the critical loss - i.e. the percentage reduc-
tion in own demand which would leave the joint profit from the two products
unchanged when the price of product 1 is increased. CL must then satisfy the
iso-profit condition
(1) ((1 + α)p1 − c1)q1(1− CL)− (p1 − c1)q1+
(p2 − c2)q2(1 + αη21)− (p2 − c2)q2 = 0
We can solve for CL as :
(2) CL =
α
α+ L1
(
1 +
pi2
R1
η21
)
where Lj =
pj−cj
pj
is the margin and Rj = pjqj is revenue. At the profit
maximising price, the own price elasticity equals minus the inverse of the margin.
The diversion ratio from i to j is defined as dij = ∂qi∂pj (
∂qj
∂pj
)−1. Using the
diversion ratio and the ratio of markups λij = pi−cipj−cj , it is straightforward to
show that the expression for the critical loss becomes
(3) CL =
α
α+ L1
(
1 + λ21d21
)
The two products are in the same market if the increase in price increases
the joint profits. The joint profits increases if the actual reduction in demand
for product 1 (actual loss) is smaller than the critical loss. Using the pricing
rule, the actual loss is αL1 with linear demand. The iso-profit condition in (1)
simplifies to a neat expression: the SSNIP is profitable if and only if
(4)
α
L1
< λ21d21
11For instance qj = apj + bpi+Kj , where qj is the quantity of product j and pj is the price
of product j.
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that is, if the actual loss is less than the mark-up weighted diversion ratio. As
discussed above, if this inequality holds we can conclude that the products are
in the same market. If it does not hold, further investigation is needed to see if
the market is larger or smaller than the two products. Note that this criterion
differs from the one derived in Katz and Shapiro [2003].12
The criterion in (4) can be used in a number of different ways, depending on
what information is available. We believe that in many competition cases, point
estimates can be found for some of the magnitudes in (4), and bounds on plau-
sible values can be found for the remaining ones. Often this will be sufficient to
define the market. In the next section we demonstrate the use of this framework
by means of an example from an actual competition case, where only limited
data were available.
3 An application
This section demonstrates the use of the framework from the previous section
to define the relevant market in a specific competition case. The central point
in our analysis is to use a shock in the market to estimate a diversion ratio and
apply it to the market definition criterion in (4).
3.1 The market
Travel by car from South-Western Norway to the European Continent can take
place either by road via eastern Norway, Sweden and Zealand in Denmark, or
alternatively by car ferry from a port in the region to Jylland on the Danish
mainland. Until the autumn of 2004 there were two car ferry companies sail-
ing from ports in South-western Norway. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The
company Color Line operated a ferry from Kristiansand on the southern tip
of Norway to Hirtshals on the north-east of Denmark. The ferry of the other
company, Fjord Line, sailed from Bergen on the west coast via Egersund further
south to Hanstholm in the north-west of Denmark.
Table 1.
Sailing time to Denmark Km from Bergen
Bergen 19h
Egersund 5-8h 490
Kristiansand 4-7h 660
In april 2005, Color Line introduced a ferry sailing from Bergen via Stavanger
to Denmark in addition to the Kristiansand line. After this, Fjord Line filed
a complaint to the Norwegian Competition Authority alleging that Color Line
was engaging in predatory pricing. For the alleged predation to be a breach of
competition legislation, a necessary, but not sufficient condition was that Color
Line was dominant in a greater south-western Norway ferry market, i.e. includ-
ing both its own sailings to Denmark from Kristiansand and Fjord Lines sailings
from Bergen via Egersund. Therefore, a central issue was to determine whether
12Unfortunately, there is an error in the derivation of the delineating criterion in Katz and
Shapiro [2003]. We use the corrected criterion of Daljord, Sørgard and Thomassen [2007].
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Figure 1: Map of the ferry routes.
ferries from Bergen (via Stavanger or Egersund) to Denmark were in market
with the ferry from Kristiansand to Denmark or there were separate markets.
The rest of this article address only the question of market delineation.13
In section 2 we briefly discussed the choice of whether to increase one or both
prices when performing a SSNIP experiment. Some industry characteristics
provide an argument for increasing only one price:
• The Kristiansand ferry (from now on called K) has much larger passenger
numbers than the ferry from Bergen (B). The negative impact on the
profit of K from a proportionate increase in its price may dwarf the positive
contribution from diversion from B to K. The test may then fail to identify
the asymmetric constraint on B by K.
• East of Kristiansand there are two ports from which car ferries sail to
Denmark. It is likely that these ferries exert some competitive constraint
on K.
These facts together indicate that joint ownership of the B and K ferries might
13At a later stage in the investigation, it was found that no abuse had taken place, and so
the questions of dominance and the relevant market were in fact not decisive in this case.
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not make it profitable to increase prices on K. This is not because B and K are
not in the same market, but because K is part of a greater market. When we
want to check only if B is in market with K, it makes more sense to examine
the joint profits of B and K by only increasing the price of B.
3.2 The shock
The ideal natural experiment to identify the diversion ratio from B to K would
be a unilateral price change by B. Following a price decrease by B alone, assume
that B increases the number of passengers with ∆qB while K loses ∆qK pas-
sengers. Assuming linear demand, the diversion ratio is then the fraction of the
new passengers at K have shifted from B, that is, dKB = ∆qK∆qB . The linearity as-
sumption implies there is no difference between the ratio of changes in quantities
following from a finite change in prices (which is what we observe) and the ratio
of changes in quantities following from an infinitesimal change in prices (which
is what the derivative is about). We later relax the linearity assumption and
show that in a sense, the results don’t critically rely on the linearity assumption.
The shock that we analyse is the introduction of a new ferry by Fjord Line
from Bergen in April 2003 that increased its capacity substantially. We do not
have adequate price data, but we assume that prices were set optimally prior to
the expansion of capacity. If so, Fjord Line must have lowered prices in order to
sell out its increased capacity.14 We regard the introduction of the new ferry on
B as equivalent to a change in the relative prices of B and K, with the former
decreasing relative to the latter.
The observed shock differs from the natural experiment described above in one
important respect. If B lowered its price to attract more passengers and Color
Line did not change its price, we could directly measure the diversion ratio.
However, it might be profitable for K to respond to Bs price reduction by re-
ducing its own price, but less than B.15 If so, we will observe a smaller reduction
in K passenger numbers than if Ks price had remained fixed and the estimate
will be biased downwards. It implies that if any bias, we could from our results
conclude that they do not belong to the same market when they in fact do
belong to the same market.
There are three clearly distinguishable customer groups: Return travelers with-
out car (going for on-board shopping and entertainment), holiday travelers with
a car, and goods transport. There is price discrimination between the three
groups of customers, and accordingly they could possibly be in separate mar-
kets. Our working hypothesis is that B and K may be in the same market as
regards the second group of customers. The first group of customers is most
likely in a local market only, while the third could possibly include other ferries.
The first and the third group of customers are spread out evenly throughout
the year. The second group, however, dominate completely in the Norwegian
summer holiday month of July. Since we only have access to total passenger
14Alternatively, the ferry operator could spur its sales by increasing its sales efforts, for
example, advertising outlays. If so, by reinterpreting the relative price change as a relative
hedonic price change, the argument is unaffected. We don’t observe prices anyhow.
15See, for instance, Farrell and Shapiro [1990].
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numbers every month, we look at the effects of the shock on passenger numbers
in July only. These numbers should give a good approximation to the substi-
tution behaviour of holiday travelers, since in July the overwhelming majority
of passengers fall in this category. We therefore limit our investigation to the
market for holiday travelers with a car.16
July passenger numbers are higher than those in every other month. It is there-
fore likely that the capacity is a binding constraint in July, but that it might
not be in off-peak months. By focusing on July we therefore measure the effect
in the period where a capacity effect would change Bs pricing behaviour.
3.3 Data and estimation
We have 142 observations of monthly total passenger numbers for B and K
respectively, going from July 1993 to April 2005.17 Figure 1 plots the passenger
numbers. The most obvious features of the data are
1. Very stable passenger numbers across the years, with regular seasonal
variation for both ferries
2. Much higher passenger numbers for K than for B
3. A reduction in the July peaks for K after the shock, and an increase in
the July peaks of B after the shock
Our estimate of the diversion ratio will be the effect of the shock on July
passenger numbers for K, divided by the effect on the July numbers for B.
Because of (1), seasonal variation appears to explain most of the movement
in passenger numbers. We therefore run a regression for each ferry of passenger
numbers on eleven month dummies plus a constant. Because of (3), we also in-
clude in the regression an extra set of month dummies that are zero before the
shock and thereafter the same as the other month dummies. This captures the
(seasonally varying) effects of the shock, after controlling for the usual seasonal
variation by the month dummies that span the whole sample period. The July
effects of the shock that we are looking for will now be the coefficients on the
July shock dummies for B and K, respectively. The model is very simple in that
no other explanatory variables are included other than the month dummies.18
3.4 Results and market delineation
The coefficients on the July shock are 25,600 for B and - 20,100 for K, both
highly significant in our model, see the appendix for full estimation results. The
16Since we consider only July, we have to be careful with the interpretation of our results
for other months than July. Even those travellers we would label ’holiday travellers with a
car’ might have another demand pattern when they travel in other months than July.
17The data are from ShipPax and they are publicly available.
18We also tried to add lagged values of passenger numbers (both lag 1 and lag 12) to the
estimated equation, but found that it hardly changed our results. We also tried to estimate
the two equations together with generalised least squares, as well as generalised least squares
with four other ferry lines from Southern Norway to Denmark. Neither of these approaches
changed our results anything but marginally.
9
July shock coefficients have the interpretation of average change in passenger
numbers in July due to the shock, compared to the average passenger numbers
in July before the shock. Since the passenger numbers are very stable before
the shock, as can be seen from figure 2, the changes are precisely estimated.
The estimated diversion ratio is the absolute value of the ratio for the effects of
the shock on K and B, respectively. This number is 0.78, see the Appendix for
a discussion on the choice of estimator for this ratio.
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Figure 2: Monthly passenger numbers 1993 to 2005.
This is a high diversion ratio. If we think for a moment about what this
number represents, it is not implausible, however. B stops at Egersund which is
170km away from Kristiansand and 490km away from Bergen. The duration of
the trip to Denmark is 4-7 hours from Kristiansand, 5-8 hours from Egersund,
and 19 hours from Bergen. For customers who live close to Kristiansand, using
B would entail both extra driving time and extra sailing time. It seems unlikely
that B and K are good substitutes for these customers. For customers living
around Egersund, the customer group most likely to substitute when the price
changes, the additional driving time to Kristiansand is largely made up for by
shorter sailing time. For these customers, it is reasonable to expect that K and
B are close substitutes. A diversion ratio of 0.78 is therefore consistent with the
story that a large percentage of the additional customers to B after the shock
are people from around Egersund, who would have used K before the shock,
but who now find B a better alternative. Travelers living around Egersund need
to travel even further away than Kristiansand to use an alternative ferry. The
diversion ratio of 0.78 therefore implies that 22% of the new customers to B
are people who prior to the capacity expansion would not have taken a ferry
at all, or who would have gone even further away than Kristiansand. It is not
obvious that this percentage should be any higher. We therefore conclude that
our estimate of the diversion ratio is plausible.
Before we perform the actual SSNIP test on this market, we recall the con-
clusions from the discussion in section 2. If the SSNIP is profitable for a hypo-
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thetical monopolist who owns both products, we can conclude that the products
are in the same market. If it is not profitable, we need to investigate substitu-
tion patterns further in order to draw a conclusion. From (4) in section 2, the
SSNIP is profitable, and so B and K are in the same market if
(5)
α
LB
< λKBdKB
We now have an estimate of dKB of 0.78, we let α = 0.05 and the margin LB
must be between zero and one. This allows us to plot all the combinations of LB
and λKB = pK−cKpB−cB that leave the profit unchanged when the price is increased
by a percentage (see figure 2). If the actual combination (LB , λKB) is above
the line, K and B are in the same market.
If we take as a starting point the assumption that the ratio of mark-ups is
one, Figure 3 shows that both B and K must have a very low margin (below
10%) for the SSNIP to be unprofitable. Note that we consider the short run
margin, where for example costs associated with the ferry as such are not in-
cluded. In this setting it seems implausible that the margin should be as low as
10%. Mark-ups may differ between B and K. Passengers spend substantially
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
LB
! K
,B
Same market
Figure 3: Delineating level set linear demand.
more time on a Fjord Line trip between Bergen and Denmark than a Color Line
trip between Kristiansand and Denmark. This may indicate a larger potential
for on-board sales for each passenger on B that increases the mark-up pB − cB .
If so, the relative mark-up λKB is below one. On the other hand, it is not
necessarily any positive relationship between on-board sales and the price-cost
margin per passenger. For example, it can be argued that K has a better on-
board service which leads to higher on-board sales for each passenger. If so, it
might be that λKB is higher and possibly above one. In both scenarios, though,
there must be a combination of a low relative markup of K combined with an
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implausibly small margin of B to conclude that the SSNIP is not profitable. For
example, if λKB = 0.5, B’s margin must be slightly above 13% and for the price
increase to be unprofitable.
All in all it appears highly unlikely that (LB , λKB) should be below the line
drawn in Figure 3. We can therefore conclude with reasonable certainty that
the car ferries to Denmark from Bergen and from Kristiansand are in the same
market. Our analysis has the advantage of making explicit the assumptions
which allow us to draw this conclusion. To dispute the conclusion, discussion
would have to focus on whether mark-ups do not satisfy the bounds that we
impose, or possible alternative reasons for the changes in passenger numbers
which have not been included as explanatory variables in our analysis.
3.5 A sensitivity analysis with respect to the form of the
demand function
Up until now we have assumed that demand functions are linear in both prices.
We now briefly discuss the results if we instead assume that demand is iso-
elastic.19
Among commonly used demand functions, linear demand (LD) and constant
elasticities demand20 (CE) represents extremes in terms of the curvature of de-
mand, in that for instance both logit and AIDS tend to be more convex than
LD, but less convex that CE,see Crooke, Froeb, Tschantz and Werden [1999].
Therefore, if the same market definition is arrived at with both LD and CE,
there is a sense in which the conclusion does not rest on strong assumptions
about the shape of the demand function.21
Figure 4 shows the thresholds for market delineation for both linear and con-
stant elasticities demand. Note that the CE structure require more information.
The CE delineating criterion depends on the ratios of prices pKpB between the
two products, see the appendix for the derivation. We have therefore plotted
the graphs for a range of values of this ratio. Since the trajectory from Bergen
is substantially longer, it is unlikely that this ratio should be higher than one.
The criterion also depends on the ratio of quantities qKqB . This has been set to
five the ratio of passengers prior to the shock. The graph shows that the con-
clusions from the previous section are robust to changes in the assumed form of
the demand function.
4 Concluding remarks
We have shown how to delineate markets using shock analysis in accordance
with the principles of the SSNIP test without knowledge of demand elasticities
19The iso-elastic demand structure leads to different expressions for actual and critical loss,
see the appendix for derivation of the appropriate criterion.
20For instance qj = ajp
ηjj
j p
ηji
i , where qj is the quantity of product j while pj is the price
of product j.
21It is likely that the form of the demand function would matter more for our results if we
had increased the price of both products instead of just one, since constant elasticities demand
implies smaller own-price effects on quantities.
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Figure 4: Delineating level set linear and constant elasticity demand.
or exact information on profitability. We show that there are three pieces of
information that is needed in a SSNIP test for a candidate market with two
products: The diversion ratio, product 1’s price cost margin and the relative
mark-up of the two products. If evidence of substitution can be defined in terms
of diversion ratios, measured substitution can be properly evaluated within the
SSNIP framework with a minimum of structure. Even in the absence of precise
measurements of product level profitability, it may be posible to establish useful
bounds to their sizes.
The application can be regarded either as shock analysis firmly linked to a
well defined criterion, or as a SSNIP test performed with very limited data.
In any case we believe the approach to be widely applicable and that it can
contribute to more informed decisions about market definition where there is
limited information about demand.
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A Regression results
The regression results for the OLS-specification are reported below. Both equa-
tions regress passenger numbers on eleven monthly dummies, a constant and a
dummy for July post-shock.
A.1 OLS regression K passengers
Equation Obs Parms R2 F-Stat P
Kpax 142 12 0,9777 470,34 0,0000
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Coef. Std. Err. t p-value
βˆFebK 7701,417 3811,944 2,02 0,044
βˆMarK 20060,75 3811,944 5,26 0,000
βˆAprK 37151,67 3811,944 9,75 0,000
βˆMayK 53597,48 3897,616 13,75 0,000
βˆJunK 87888,58 3897,616 22,55 0,000
βˆJulyK 212723,9 3998 53,21 0,000
βˆAugK 117270,3 3811,944 30,76 0,000
βˆSepK 40665,67 3811,944 10,67 0,000
βˆOctK 27897,75 3811,944 7,32 0,000
βˆNovK 6109,167 3811,944 1,60 0,110
βˆDecK 6952,667 3811,944 1,82 0,069
βˆexpK -20052,2 7232,655 -2,77 0,006
βˆconsB 40697,33 2695,451 15,10 0,000
A.2 OLS regression B passengers
Equation Obs Parms R2 F-Stat P
Bpax 142 12 0,8887 85,80 0,0000
Coef. Std. Err. t p-value
βˆFebB 4325,833 1684,817 2,57 0,011
βˆMarB 7049,667 1684,817 4,18 0,000
βˆAprB 8556,167 1684,817 5,08 0,000
βˆMayB 10287,1 1722,683 5,97 0,000
βˆJunB 18506,1 1722,683 10,74 0,000
βˆJulyB 36218,72 1767,051 20,50 0,000
βˆAugB 21991,42 1684,817 13,05 0,000
βˆSepB 7825,167 1684,817 4,64 0,000
βˆOctB 7406,25 1684,817 4,40 0,000
βˆNovB 3443,75 1684,817 2,04 0,042
βˆDecB 3233,667 1684,817 1,92 0,056
βˆexpB 25632,7 3196,716 8,02 0,000
βˆconsB 7617,083 1191,346 6,39 0,000
B Some notes on the diversion ratio estimators
B.1 Asymptotic properties
Under the assumption of linear demand, the diversion ratio is dKB = ∂qK∂qB
(
∂qB
∂pB
)−1
,
the ratio of changes in demand for the two products following the decrease in
pB . The expansion coefficients in the specification measure the average devia-
tions from the expected volumes, but for the expansion. Our estimator of the
diversion ratio is the ratio of expansion coefficients in July
(6) dˆKB =
βˆexpK
βˆexpB
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Under the regular assumptions, the OLS estimates of the expansion coefficients
are individually unbiased and consistent estimates, however, the ratio of the
expansion coefficients is a biased, but consistent estimator of the true ratio.
Consistency can be seen from applying Slutskys theorem to the ratio. The bias
can be seen from a second-order expansion of the ratio around the true means
of the βˆs:
(7) E
(
βˆexpK
βˆexpB
)
≈ β
exp
K
βexpB
+
(
1
βexpB
)2(
σ2
βˆexpB
βexpK
βexpB
− cov(βˆexpk , βˆexpB )
)
where the second term on the right hand side is an approximation to the bias
induced by the non-linear entry of βˆexpB . The bias is increasing in the variance
of βˆexpB due to the disproportional impact of errors of equal absolute value, but
different signs. Correlation between the expansion coefficients may exacerbate
or attenuate the bias depending on the sign of the covariate. The bias flows
from the asymmetric effect of errors in βˆexpB that cause a skewed distribution of
the estimator in small samples. The bias is most severe when the denominator
is close to zero, where close is understood in terms of its variance. The true
values of the first-and second-order moments are unknown. An estimate of the
bias is derived by substituting the empirical first-and second-order moments for
the true values.
An approximation to the variance of the ratio of coefficients is derived by a
first-order expansion of the variance of the ratio around the true means of the
coefficients
(8) var
(
βˆexpK
βˆexpB
)
≈
(
1
βexpB
)2(
σ2
βˆexpB
(
βexpK
βexpB
)2
+ σ2
βˆexpK
− 2β
exp
K
βexpB
cov(βˆexpK , βˆ
exp
B )
)
where the estimator of the variance is given by substituting the empirical first-
and second order moments for their true values.
The small-sample skewness of the distribution of the ratio estimator may ren-
der normal-based confidence intervals improper measures of precision. Since
the small-sample distribution of the estimator is hard to derive even under
strong distributional assumptions of the residuals from the regression, an ap-
propriate alternative is a bootstrap-percentile approach. Bootstrap estimators
of standard errors and percentiles are easily implemented in modern statistical
packages. Since the bias in our application is small, we don’t report bootstrap
percentiles.
A caveat to using the OLS-estimator is that the correlation across equations
is zero by assumption so the covariates in (7) and (8) drop out. That is fine
under the null of independent markets, but more problematic under the al-
ternative hypothesis of substantial substitution. There is an easy fix to the
problem. As is well-known, when regressors are equal across equations, the
OLS-estimator of the coefficients are the SURE estimators.22 Reinterpreting
the coefficients as SURE-estimators, we may calculate the SURE covariance
estimator
(
X ′(Σˆ−1 ⊗ I2)X
)−1 , where Σˆ = 1T Uˆ ′Uˆ and Uˆ = (uˆK , uˆB) while
22Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations.
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preserving the estimates of the coefficients.23 The SURE covariance estimator
is routinely reported by most statistical packages.
The expansion in (7) suggests a bias-corrected estimator dˆbcKB simply from sub-
tracting the expected bias:
(9) dˆbcKB =
βˆexpK
βˆexpB
−
(
1
βˆexpB
)2(
σˆ2
βˆexpB
βˆexpK
βˆexpB
− cov(βˆexpK , βˆexpB )
)
The estimator can be shown to be consistent. The bias correction comes at the
cost of a potential decrease in efficiency due to additional sampling errors in
the correction term. We may be trading off bias for inefficiency. Monte Carlo
experiments suggests that the loss of efficiency may be severe for imprecise
estimates at very non-linear intervals (i.e. close to zero), but the evidence is not
clear.24 In some applications, the bias corrected estimator is more efficient. In
the latter case, the choice of estimator is unproblematic.
B.2 Concluding remarks on the choice of estimators
Though our reported estimator of the diversion ratio in (6) is biased, the ex-
pected bias of the estimator is trivial in our application, mainly due to the
precise estimates of the denominators. Hence, the simple ratio of expansion
coefficients is a good estimator and is chosen on the virtue of simplicity.
The variance of the estimator may be approximated by the delta-method. Due
to the small expected bias in our application, we don’t report bootstrap per-
centiles of the estimator. In our application, allowing for correlation across
equations hardly matter for the estimate of the variance of the diversion ratio.
In the name of simplicity, we report variance estimates disregarding simultane-
ous correlations across equations.
The variance of both estimators are for all practical purposes equal. However,
since there really doesn‘t seem to be much to gain from correcting the estimator,
we opt for the simple estimator. One should nevertheless be cautious using the
ratio of coefficients in small samples if the denominator is either estimated with
poor precision or is close to zero, as the bias may be severe.
B.3 Diversion ratio estimates
B.4 Linear demand diversion ratio
Coef. Std. Err. t p-value
dˆKB -,7822898 ,2985555 -2,62 0,009
B.5 Bias corrected linear demand diversion ratio
Coef. Std. Err. t p-value
dˆbcKB -,7701227 ,2929343 -2,63 0,009
23see Davidson & MacKinnon (2003).
24We have performed some illustrative Monte-Carlo experiments on the ratio estimator and
their bootstrap percentiles for interested readers. The experiments are available upon request
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C The case of constant elasticity
C.1 Actual and Critical Loss
The expressions for Actual and Critical Loss get more complex and require
more information under the alternative assumption of demand of the constant
elasticity (CE) form. Let the CE demand functions in the two-product case be
given by
q1(p) = a1p
η11
1 p
η12
2(10)
q2(p) = a2p
η21
1 p
η22
2(11)
where the exponents η are the respective elasticities of demand. Then actual
loss of product 1 is given by
(12) ALCE = (1 + α)η11 − 1
where pssnip = ((1 + α)p1, p2). The relative change in volume of product 2 is
similarly given by
(13)
q2(pssnip)− q2(p)
q2(p)
= (1 + α)η21 − 1
Substituting (13) for αη21 in (2) and rearranging, the critical loss of product 1
is reduced to
(14) CLCE =
α
α+ L1
(
1 +
λ21L1δ21
αγ21
(
(1 + α)η21 − 1)
)
where δ21 = q2q1 and γ21 =
p2
p1
. In lack of data on prices, the case of constant
elasticity requires one further assumption on the relative prices. Note that
δ21 and γ21 are evaluated at their pre-shock values. From (12) and (14), the
delineating criterion in the CE case becomes
(15) (1 + α)
1
L1 − 1 < α
α+ L1
(
1 +
λ21L1δ21
αγ21
(
(1 + α)η21 − 1)
)
where we have used the pricing rule to substitute for η11 and η21 is the parameter
of substitution to be estimated.
C.2 CE estimator of substitution
The diversion ratio estimator in (6) relies on the structural assumption of linear
demand. Under the assumption of constant elasticity of demand, the coefficients
from the regressions require reinterpretation.
From (14), it is clearly an empirically more convenient strategy to estimate the
crossprice-elasticity rather than the diversion ratio. Say demand is observed
before and after the shock, but prices are unobserved. Let the shock lead to an
unobserved decrease in the price of product 1 of κ percent. Pre-shock, the price
vector is given by p = (p1, p2) and, given the assumption of no price-response
of product 2, post-shock the price vector is ps = ((1 + κ)p1, p2). As in the case
of linear demand, the assumption of no price response of product 2 attenuates
18
the measured substitution. The bias is towards less substitution, hence broader
markets. Under the null of independent markets, however, the bias-causing
price response is from small to zero.
Pre-shock, demand is given by q(p) and post-shock by q(ps). Define the rel-
ative post-shock volume of product j as Φj =
qj(p
s)
qj(p)
. Taking logs of Φ and
inserting in the pricing equation, we have two equations in the two unknowns
η21 and κ, with (real) solution25
η21 = − 1L1
ln(Φ2)
ln(Φ1)
(16)
κ = Φ−L11(17)
The measure of substitution is now a function of observable passenger data q
and L1.
For comparison with the case of linear demand and assuming a margin of say
0.5, we may back out the diversion ratio from the estimates of the crossprice-
elasticity and the pre- and post-shock volumes as
(18) d21 = η21δ21L1
Note that unlike the case of linear demand, the diversion ratio now varies with
relative volumes due to the constancy of the elasticity, so the diversion ratio
must be evaluated at some ratio of volumes δ. In the application, we evaluate
the diversion ratio at the pre-SSNIP relative passenger volumes.
The Φs and δs in the application are simple functions of the coefficients from
regressions reported above:
ΦˆB =
βˆconstB + βˆ
July
B + βˆ
expJuly
B
βˆconstB + βˆ
July
B
(19)
ΦˆK =
βˆconstK + βˆ
July
K + βˆ
expJuly
K
βˆconstK + βˆ
July
K
(20)
δˆKB =
βˆconstK + βˆ
July
K
βˆconstB + βˆ
July
B
(21)
The estimators share the property of the linear demand diversion ratio in be-
ing biased, but consistent. The expected bias is small in our application and
the uncorrected estimators have the virtue of being simpler than their bias cor-
rected alternatives. Below are point estimates of the essential variables with the
standard errors calculated by the delta method at a L = 0.5.
25There is one additional complex solution we ignore
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C.2.1 Constant elasticity estimators evaluated at margin .5
Coef. Std. Err. t p-value
ΦˆB 1,584744 ,0815944 19,42 0,000
ΦˆK ,920874 ,0281762 32,68 0,000
ηˆCEKB ,3580712 ,1388103 2,58 0,010
κˆ -,2056343 ,0204499 -10,06 0,000
dˆCEKB(p) 1,035031 ,4018628 2,58 0,011
dˆCEKB(p
s) ,6014432 ,2259146 2,66 0,008
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